Neuroeconomics proposes radical changes in the methods of economics. This essay discusses the proposed changes in methodology, together with the the neuroeconomic critique of standard economics.
Introduction
Neuroeconomics proposes radical changes in the methods of economics. This essay discusses the proposed changes in methodology, together with the the neuroeconomic critique of standard economics. Our definition of neuroeconomics includes research that makes no specific reference to neuroscience and is traditionally referred to as psychology and economics. We identify neuroeconomics as research that implicitly or explicitly makes the following two claims:
Assertion I: Psychological and physiological evidence (such as descriptions of hedonic states and brain processes) are directly relevant to economic theories. In particular, they can be used to support or reject economic models or even economic methodology.
Assertion II: What makes individuals happy ('true utility') differs from what they choose. Economic welfare analysis should use true utility rather than the utilities governing choice ('choice utility').
Neuroeconomics goes beyond the common practice of economists to use psychological insights as inspiration for economic modeling or to take into account experimental evidence that challenges behavioral assumptions of economic models. Neuroeconomics appeals directly to the neuroscience evidence to reject standard economic models or to question economic constructs.
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) (henceforth CLP (2005) ) express the neuroeconomics critique with explicit reference to brain-imaging studies:
"Many of the processes that occur in these systems are affective rather than cognitive; they are directly concerned with motivation. This might not matter for economics were it not for the principles that guide the affective system -the way that it operates -is so much at variance with the standard economics account of behavior." (CLP (2005) p. [25] [26] .
Hence, the authors assert that brain-imaging evidence shows that the affective system plays a central role in many decisions and that the affective system is at odds with standard economic models.
In this essay, we argue that Assertion I of the neuroeconomic critique misunderstands economic methodology and underestimates the flexibility of standard models. Economics and psychology address different questions, utilize different abstractions, and address different types of empirical evidence. Neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models because the latter make no assumptions and draw no conclusions about the physiology of the brain. Conversely, brain science cannot revolutionize economics because the latter has no vehicle for addressing the concerns of economics. We also argue that the methods of standard economics are much more flexible than it is assumed in the neuroeconomics critique and illustrate this with examples of how standard economics deals with inconsistent preferences, mistakes, and biases.
Neuroeconomists import the questions and abstractions of psychology and re-interpret economic models as if their purpose were to address those questions. The standard economic model of choice is treated as a model of the brain and found to be inadequate. Either economics is treated as amateur brain science and rejected as such or brain evidence is treated as economic evidence to reject economic models. Kahneman (1994) asserts that subjective states and hedonic utility are "legitimate topics of study". This may be true, but such states and utilities are not useful for calibrating and testing standard economic models. Discussions of hedonic experiences play no role in standard economic analysis because economics makes no predictions about them and has no data to test such prediction. Economists also lack the means for integrating measurement of hedonic utility with standard economic data. Therefore, they have found it useful to confine themselves to the analysis of the latter.
The neuroeconomics program for change in economics ignores the fact that economists, even when dealing with questions related to those studied in psychology, have different objectives and address different empirical evidence. These fundamental differences are obscured by the tendency of neuroeconomists to describe both disciplines in very broad terms.
"Because psychology systematically explores human judgement, behavior, well-being it can teach us important facts about how human differ from the way traditionally described by economics," (Rabin (1998) ).
Note the presumption that across disciplines there is a single set of constructs (or facts) for describing how humans are. Rabin omits that economics and psychology study different kinds of behavior and, more importantly, focus on different variables that influence behavior. Realistic assumptions and useful abstractions when relating visceral cues to behavior may be less realistic or useful when relating behavior to market variables. Consider the following two statements:
"Much aversion to risks is driven by immediate fear responses, which are largely traceable to a small area of the brain called the amygdala;" (Camerer Which of these statements is (more) true? Which provides a better understanding of risk aversion? Most researchers recognize the various terms in the second statement as abstractions belonging to the specialized vocabulary of economics. Though less apparent, the language of the first statement is equally specialized in its use of discipline-specific abstractions. The terms 'immediate fear,' 'traceable,' 'risk averse behavior,' and even 'amygdala' 1 are abstractions of neuroscience and psychology. Note that the term 'risk aversion' represents a different abstraction in the two statements above. For Ingersoll, risk aversion is an attitude towards monetary gambles. For CLP (2004) , risk aversion seems to be a much broader term that is readily applied to decisions involving plane travel. It makes little sense to insist that the economic notion of risk aversion is false while the psychological notion is true.
Assertion (II) of the neuroeconomic critique misunderstands the role of welfare analysis in economics. Standard economics identifies welfare with choice, i.e., a change (in consumption) is defined to be welfare improving if and only if, given the opportunity, the individual would choose to make that change. The neuroeconomic critique of standard welfare analysis mistakes the economic definition of welfare for a theory of happiness and proceeds to find evidence against that theory. The standard definition of welfare is appropriate because standard economics has no therapeutic ambition; it does not try to improve the decision-maker but tries to evaluate how economic institutions mediate (perhaps psychologically unhealthy) behavior of agents.
Standard welfare economics functions as a part of positive economics. It provides a benchmark for the performance of economic institutions at aggregating individual preferences. Economists use welfare analysis to explain the persistence of some (efficient) institutions or to identify problems and anomalies in models of other (inefficient) institutions. Neuroeconomists expect recent developments in psychology and brain science to yield answers to age-old philosophical questions such as "what is happiness?"; "should we be willing to take actions contrary to a person's wishes if we happen to know that such actions will make them happier?" and insist on a new notion of welfare based on these answers.
Perhaps a therapist or a medical professional is guided by his answers to the two questions above; he may fashion his advice to advance the perceived objectives of the patient or to increase the patient's true happiness, as defined by the therapist himself. 2 Neuroeconomic welfare analysis assumes a relationship between the economist and economic agents similar to the therapist-patient relationship. Normative economics is therefore identified with effective therapy. The economist/therapist can influence individuals' happiness by dispensing compelling advice or by influencing the decisions of powerful (and perhaps paternalistic) intermediaries. For example, Kahneman (1994) suggests that there is 2 This description might over-state the therapist discretion. Either a professional code or market forces may limit the extent to which he can pursue the patient's true happiness. Hence, the two philosophical questions above may or may not have some relevance to the therapist. Our contention is that they have none for economists.
"...a case in favour of some paternalistic interventions, when it is plausible that the state knows more about an individual's future tastes than the individual knows presently."
Hence, the goal of welfare economics and perhaps the goal of all economics is to affect changes that result in greater happiness to all. In this endeavor neuroeconomists plan to enlist the support of the state -a stand-in for a benign therapist -who may, on occasion, conceal facts and make decisions on behalf of the individual's future selves.
Neuroeconomists seek a welfare criterion that is appropriate for an economist who is part social scientist and part advocate/therapist; someone who not only analyzes economic phenomena but also plays a role in shaping them. Neuroeconomists assert that the standard economic welfare criterion is not adequate for this task. Our response to this criticism is simple: the standard welfare criterion is not intended to facilitate advocacy for therapeutic interventions. The standard approach assumes a separation between the economist's role as social scientist and the role that some economists may play as advisors or advocates.
This separation is valuable because it enables economists to analyze and compare different
institutions without having to agree on the answers to difficult philosophical questions.
In the next section, we define the standard approach (or standard economics) and the neuroeconomics approach. In section 3, we discuss how the different goals of psychology and of economics necessitate different abstractions. As an example, we contrast the economic concepts of "complements" and "externalities" with the psychological concept of a "cue." In section 4, we present an example of each approach to illustrate our classification and highlight the differences in the concerns and abstractions of standard economics and neuroeconomics. In sections 5, 6, and 7 we discuss the three main arguments of the neuroeconomics critique. Section 8 contains our closing remarks.
The Two Approaches: Definitions and Objectives

Standard Economics
The standard approach to behavioral economics extends standard choice theoretic methods to analyze variables that are often ignored. Some of these extensions are modest and entail little more than specifying a richer set of preferences over the same economic consequences. Others necessitate novel descriptions of the relevant economic outcomes.
Yet, in most cases, the subsequent analysis is very similar to what can be found in a standard graduate textbook.
In the standard approach, the term utility maximization and choice are synonymous.
A utility function is always an ordinal index that describes how the individual ranks various outcomes and how he behaves (chooses) given his constraints (available options).
The relevant data are revealed preference data; that is, consumption choices given the individual's constraints. These data are used to calibrate the model (i.e., to identify the particular parameters) and the resulting calibrated models are used to predict future choices and perhaps equilibrium variables such as prices. Hence, standard (positive) theory identifies choice parameters from past behavior and relates these parameters to future behavior and equilibrium variables. which case it can be tested with revealed preference evidence, or it does not, in which case the modification is vacuous. In standard economics, the testable implications of a theory are its content; once they are identified, the non-choice evidence that motivated a novel theory becomes irrelevant.
As its welfare criterion, standard economics uses the individuals' choice behavior, that is, revealed preferences. Alternative x is deemed to be better than alternative y if and only if, given the opportunity, the individual would choose x over y. 3 Hence, welfare is defined to be synonymous with choice behavior.
In standard economics, an individual's decisions may improve when a constraint is relaxed. For example, an agent may make better decisions if he is given better information, more resources, or more time to make his decision. However, standard economics has no therapeutic ambition, i.e., it does not try to evaluate or improve the individual's objectives.
Economics cannot distinguish between choices that maximize happiness, choices that reflect a sense of duty, or choices that are the response to some impulse. Moreover, standard economics takes no position on the question of which of those objectives the agent should pursue.
The purpose of economics is to analyze institutions, such as trading mechanisms and organization structures, and to ask how those institutions mediate the interests of different economic agents. This analysis is useful irrespective of the causes of individuals' preferences. Standard economics ignores the therapeutic potential of economic policies and leaves it to therapists, medical professionals, and financial advisors to help individuals refine their goals.
Neuroeconomics
"'This new approach, which I consider a revolution, should provide a theory of how people decide in economic and strategic situations,' said Dr. Aldo Rustichini, an economics professor at the University of Minnesota. 'So far, the decision process has been for economists a black box. '" 4 Later, in the same article, the author explains that "In a study published in the current issue of the journal Science, Dr. Cohen and his colleagues, including Dr. Alan G. Sanfey of Princeton, took images of people's brains 3 The welfare statement is made relative to the constraints the agent faces. For example, the agent may be imperfectly informed of the consequences of his actions. In that case, the choice of x is welfare maximizing given the agent's information. If the agent had better information, he might choose y and hence y is the welfare maximizing choice for a better informed agent. See our discussion of mistakes in Section 5.1.
4 "Brain Experts Now Follow the Money," by Sandra Blakeslee, New York Times, June 17, 2003. as they played the ultimatum game, a test of fairness between two people. In the ultimatum game, the first player is given, say, £10 in cash. He must then decide how much to give to a second player. It could be £5, the fairest offer, or a lesser amount depending on what he thinks he can get away with. If Player 2 accepts the offer, the money is shared accordingly. But if he rejects it, both players go away empty-handed.
It is a one-shot game, and the players never meet again. Most people in the shoes of Player 2 refuse to take amounts under £2 or £3, Dr. Cohen said. They would rather punish the first player than feel cheated. 'But this makes no economic sense,' he said.
'You're better off with something than nothing.'"
As the quotes above illustrate, neuroeconomics emphasizes the physiological and psychological processes underlying decision-making. The objective is to relate the decision-making process to physiological processes in the brain or to descriptions of emotional experiences.
From its predecessor, psychology and economics, 5 neuroeconomics inherits the idea of modeling the decision-maker as a collection of biases and heuristics susceptible to systematic errors (effects) and inconsistencies (reversals). Hedonic utilities (true utilities) are primitives, defined independently of behavior, while behavior is determined by biases and heuristics. The focus is on showing how factors that have no effect on these true utilities-or at least affect these utilities in a manner that is ignored by standard economics-influence behavior. 
Neuroeconomics is therapeutic in its ambitions
Different Objectives Demand Different Abstractions
Neuroeconomists argue that the time is ripe for the methodology of economics to be brought in line with the methods and ideas of psychology and neuroscience. The neuroeconomic critique begins with the implicit or explicit assumption that economics, psychology and possibly other social sciences all address the same set of questions and differ only with respect to the answers they provide:
"More ambitiously, students are often bewildered that the models of human nature of- We address these arguments in sections 5, 6, and 7 respectively. We illustrate in the remainder of this section how the different goals psychology and economics and the different data available to these two disciplines necessitate different abstractions.
A Cue or a Complement?
The concept of a "cue" offers a good illustration of how abstractions from psychology are inappropriate for economics and, conversely, how the corresponding economic concepts are inappropriate for psychology and neuroscience. Psychologists call a stimulus that triggers a desire or a craving for a particular consumption or activity a "cue" or a "cue-elicited craving." 6 For example, eating a hamburger may be a cue that triggers a craving for French fries. Drinking coffee may trigger a craving for cigarettes. Visiting the location of previous drug consumption may trigger a craving for drugs. As the example of drug consumption illustrates, cues may be determined endogenously through a process of conditioning. 7 Psychologists find the concept of a cue useful because they think of cues as exogenous variables in experimental settings. They investigate the physiological mechanisms behind the development of and the reaction to cues. For economists, the notion of a cue is not useful because it lumps together two distinct economic phenomena: complements and externalities.
Hamburgers and fries are complementary goods just like forks and knives. Forks do not generate a craving for knives and therefore psychologists would not consider the fork/knife complementarity to be the same phenomenon as the hamburger/fries complementarity. For economists the physiological distinction between the two examples is unimportant. What matters is that demand for those goods responds in a similar way to price changes.
Another form of complementarities is the one associated with non-separable preferences over consumption streams. For example, consider an individual who enjoys building matchstick models and, as a result of this hobby, develops a complementary demand for matches and glue. The complementary demand for matches and glue is acquired through learning a hobby while the complementary demand for coffee and cigarettes is acquired through a process of conditioning. For a psychologist, who is interested in the underlying causes of preferences, the coffee/cigarette and glue/matchsticks complementarities represent distinct phenomena. The first is an example of conditioning while the second is an example of learning. However, both examples are similar in terms of the variables that economists observe and care about (prices, demand).
In the cue-response pairs above, the individual controls both the cue and the response.
However, some cues are not under the control of the individual. For example, a former drug addict may experience a craving for drugs as he observes drug dealers in his neighborhood.
In economics, this effect is captured by the notion of an externality. For economists, the neighborhood effect on drug addicts is similar to the effect of an improved network of roads on car buyers. Both are examples of an externality that causes a shift in the demand for a good. For psychologists, the craving for drugs by seeing drug-dealers in the neighborhood is similar to the craving for cigarettes caused by drinking coffee. On the other hand, they would consider it absurd to describe the car buying example and drug addiction example as being the same phenomenon because the underlying psychological mechanisms are very different. It would be equally absurd to insist that economists treat the neighborhood effect on drug demand as the same phenomenon as the cigarette/coffee complementarity.
In economics, there are important reasons for distinguishing between complementarities and externalities. For example, externalities often suggest market failures while complementarities do not.
Economists and psychologists use different abstractions because they are interested in different phenomena and must confront different data. 'Cue-triggered responses' is not a useful abstraction in economics because it lumps together distinct economic phenomena.
Conversely, the economic abstraction of a complement is not useful in psychology because it lumps together phenomena with different psychological mechanisms.
The Two Approaches: Examples
In this section, we illustrate the standard approach to novel behavioral phenomena with a discussion of the paper "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice
Theory," by Kreps and Porteus (1978) . We illustrate the neuroeconomics approach with a recent paper by Köszegi and Rabin (2005) entitled "Reference-Dependent Utility."
The Standard Approach: Resolution of Uncertainty
An individual goes to the hospital on Friday to have a biopsy of a suspicious mass. In case the biopsy detects cancer, surgery will be scheduled for the following Monday. When given a choice between waiting a few hours to learn the result or going home and learning the result on Monday, the individual chooses to wait. The decision to incur the cost of waiting seems plausible but is inconsistent with standard theory. Standard expected utility maximizers are indifferent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
In "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice" Kreps and Porteus (1978) (henceforth Kreps-Porteus) expand the standard model of decision making under uncertainty to include anxious individuals such as the patient in the example above. 8 Suppose there are two dates t = 1, 2 and a finite set of prizes Z that will be consumed at date 2 ("surgery" or "no surgery" in the example above). Standard decision theory under uncertainty defines lotteries over Z as the choice objects. But this description does not 8 The relationship between anxiety and preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty is explored and further developed in the work of Caplin and Leahy (2001) . differentiate between lotteries that resolve at date 1 and lotteries that resolve at date 2 -and therefore cannot capture the anxious patient described above.
Let D 2 be the lotteries over Z and let D 1 be lotteries over D 2 . Hence, D 1 is the set of lotteries over lotteries over Z. We refer to elements of D 1 as date-1 lotteries and elements of D 2 as date-2 lotteries. We can describe the problem of the anxious patient as a choice between two lotteries in D 1 . Suppose the probability of surgery is α. Waiting for the results until Monday corresponds to a date-1 lottery where, with probability 1, the individual will face the date 2 lottery that yields surgery with probability α and no surgery with probability 1 − α. Learning the result on Friday corresponds to the date-1 lottery where, with probability α, the individual faces a date-2 lottery that yields surgery with probability 1 and, with probability 1 − α, the individual faces a date-2 lottery that yields surgery with probability 0.
Let p, q denote elements in D 2 and µ, ν denote elements in D 1 . For simplicity, we only consider lotteries with finite supports. Let µ(p) be the probability that µ chooses the lottery p ∈ D 2 . Standard expected utility theory identifies µ with the implied probability distribution over prizes, i.e., the probability distribution q ∈ D 2 that assigns probability
to prize z ∈ Z. Therefore, standard expected utility theory cannot accommodate the cancer patient's strict preference for learning the test results on Friday.
The Kreps-Porteus model takes as a primitive an individual's preferences º (choices) over the date-1 lotteries, D 1 . Some date-1 lotteries yield a particular date-2 lottery with probability 1. We call such lotteries degenerate date-1 lotteries. In the example above, learning the test results on Monday corresponds to such a lottery. Restricting the preference º to degenerate date-1 lotteries, induces a preference on D 2 , the date-2 lotteries.
Let δ p denote the date-1 lottery that yields the date-2 lottery p with probability 1. The induced preference º 2 (on D 2 ) is defined as follows: 
The formula above applies the standard expected utility formula twice. The term in brackets is the expected utility formula for lotteries that resolve at date 2 whereas the outer term is the expected utility formula for lotteries that resolve at date 1. Note the key steps in the modeling exercise: Kreps-Porteus start with a novel psychological phenomenon and identify the economically relevant consequences of that phenomenon. Once the economically meaningful consequences are identified, the psychological causes become irrelevant. For the patient above, the source of the preference for early resolution of uncertainty is anxiety. But there could be many other reasons for a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Suppose, for example, the agent owns a lottery ticket that will either yield a large reward (with small probability) or nothing. Prior to the lottery drawing, the agent must decide which car to purchase. The outcome of the lottery will typically affect the optimal car buying decision and, therefore, the agent would be better off if the lottery drawing was held earlier. Hence, the induced preferences over lotteries imply a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. In this case, the agent has perfectly standard preferences. The preference for early resolution of uncertainty comes about because the agent has a second payoff-relevant decision to make after choosing a lottery.
In the two examples, the causes of the decision-maker's preference for early resolution of uncertainty are different. In the first example the patient is trying to avoid anxiety while in the second decision problem he is trying to make a better informed decision.
For a standard economist this distinction is irrelevant because standard economics does not study the causes of preferences. For standard theory, the only relevant distinctions between the two examples are the ones that can be identified through the decision-makers' preferences. 9
The Kreps-Porteus theorem identifies a formula that resembles standard expected utility applied separately at each decision date. While the formula is suggestive of a mental process, this suggestiveness is an expositional devices not meant to be taken literally. 10 The formula encapsulates the behavioral assumptions of the theory in a user-friendly way and thereby facilitates applications of the theory to (more complicated) economic problems.
The theory is successful if preference for early resolution of uncertainty turns out to be an empirically important phenomenon; that is, if models that incorporate it are successful at addressing economic behavior. The role of the axioms is to summarize the empirical content of the theory independently of the specific application. The generality of representation theorem, the usefulness of the key parameters, the ease with which the parameters can be measured and, most importantly, the empirical success of the model at dealing with economic evidence determine the extent to which the theory succeeds.
Kreps-Porteus's model has been generalized and applied to Macroeconomics and Finance (see Zin (1991a, 1991b) ). These fields analyze dynamic consumption choice under uncertainty. The primitives of Kreps-Porteus's model (dated lotteries) are 9 For example, the Kreps-Porteus independence axiom may not be appropriate in the case where the agent has a second decision to make whereas the anxious patient might very well satisfy it. 10 A teacher in an intermediate micro class might say something like, "the consumer equates the marginal utility of consuming the good to the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on the good," while explaining a first order condition in a partial equilibrium model with separable preferences. This statement is meant to provide some intuition for the first order condition, not as a description of the consumer's mental process: the marginal utilities in question depend on the particular utility function used to represent the preference and hence are, to some extent, arbitrary. There is no presumption that either these particular marginal utilities or the underlying calculus arguments are the actual currency of the consumer's reasoning. easily adapted to match closely the objects studied in Macroeconomics and Finance. The fact that Kreps-Porteus strip all economically irrelevant details from their model is essential for the success of this adaptation.
Neuroeconomics: Reference Dependent Utility
In a well-known experiment (Thaler 1980) ), a random subset of the subjects are assigned one unit of some object and then all subjects' reservation prices for this object are elicited. The price at which subjects who were assigned a unit are willing to sell it typically exceeds the price at which the remaining subjects are willing to buy a unit. This phenomenon is referred to as the endowment effect and has motivated models that add a reference point to the utility function.
Köszegi and Rabin (2005) (henceforth Köszegi-Rabin) propose a novel referencedependent preference theory. To understand the Köszegi-Rabin theory, consider a finite set of choice objects X. 11 A reference-dependent utility function U , associates a utility with each reference point z ∈ X and each choice object x ∈ X. Hence, U : X × X → IR, where U(x, z) is the utility of x given the reference z. This formulation of utility is not new; the novelty is in the adoption of Köszegi (2004)'s notion of a personal equilibrium to determine the reference point.
Köszegi-Rabin define the reference point as the x that ultimately gets chosen. With this interpretation, reference-dependent utility maximization yields for any choice set A,
for all y ∈ A. Hence, an alternative x ∈ A is optimal (i.e., a possible choice) for a Köszegi-Rabin decision-maker if (and only if) condition (2) above is satisfied. Köszegi-Rabin assume that U has the form
where µ is an increasing function with µ(0) = 0 and K is some finite set indexing the relevant hedonic dimensions of consumption. Köszegi-Rabin note that these consumption dimensions "should be specified based on psychological principles." 11 An element x ∈ X may be uncertain (i.e., may be a lottery).
Köszegi-Rabin also require that
for all x, y ∈ X.
There are certain striking differences between the approaches of Kreps-Porteus and Köszegi-Rabin. In Kreps-Porteus, the formula is an "as if" statement and the assumed restrictions on choice behavior (axioms) are the content of the theory. In contrast, Köszegi-Rabin interpret the procedure associated with computing a personal equilibrium as a description of the underlying psychological process. Köszegi-Rabin focus on psychological evidence supporting this procedure and the various assumptions on the function U .
To facilitate the comparison of the difference in the two approaches, we provide a revealed preference analysis of the Köszegi-Rabin model for the case of no uncertainty. 12 Let X be finite and let Y be the set of all nonempty subsets of X.
In revealed preference terms, the Köszegi-Rabin model is an investigation of a special class of choice functions. Given any state dependent utility function U , define C(·, U) as follows:
A choice function c is a general Köszegi-Rabin choice function if there exists a reference dependent utility function U such that c = C(·, U). If the U also satisfies (3) and (4) then c is a a special Köszegi-Rabin choice function. For any binary relation º, define the function C º as follows:
It is easy to construct examples where C º (A) = ∅ unless certain assumptions are made on º. We say that the choice function c is induced by the binary relation º, if c(A) = C º (A)
for all A ∈ Y . It is well-known that C º is a choice function whenever º is complete (x º y or y º x for all x, y ∈ X) and transitive (x º y and y º z implies x º z for all x, y, z ∈ X).
However, transitivity is not necessary for C º to be a choice function. The proposition characterizes Köszegi-Rabin choice functions:
The following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) c is a general Köszegi-Rabin choice function
(ii) c is a choice function induced by some complete binary relation (iii) c is a special Köszegi-Rabin choice function
Proof: See Appendix
Note that c = C º is a choice function implies º is complete. Hence, we may omit the word complete in the above proposition. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) establishes that abandoning transitivity is the only revealed preference implication of the Köszegi-Rabin theory. The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) implies that the particular functional form (3) and condition (4) are without loss of generality.
Note the distinction between the Köszegi-Rabin approach and our approach to the same model. We take the revealed choice behavior c as given and construct the U (or u k 's, µ) that are needed to generate this behavior. Köszegi-Rabin would argue that these functions and the dimensions of relevant consumption are not choice variables for the theorist, and that they should be determined based on psychological principles.
The revealed preference analysis answers the following question: suppose the modeler could not determine the individual ingredients that go into the representation, how can he check whether or not the decision-maker behaves in a manner consistent with such a representation? Or to put it differently, how is the behavior of a Köszegi-Rabin-decision maker different from a standard decision-maker? The answer turns out be that the revealed preference relation of the Köszegi-Rabin decision-maker may fail transitivity.
The difference between the Kreps-Porteus and the Köszegi-Rabin approaches can be re-stated as follows: Kreps-Porteus assume that the utility functions W, u can be measured only by observing choices. The choice of a lottery in period 1 is treated as observable, while the utility functions are the modeler's abstractions, and are taken to be unobservable. Restrictions on the particular functional form are inferred from choice behavior. For example, if the agent prefers lotteries that resolve early to lotteries that imply the same distribution over prizes but resolve late, then the utility function W must be convex. Hence, behavior is used to calibrate the model before additional predictions can be made.
In contrast, Köszegi-Rabin do not view the representation as an "as if" statement.
They treat the relevant dimension of hedonic utility and the values of the various options along these dimensions as observable and quantifiable. They emphasize that this quantification requires craft and an understanding of psychological principles.
"Several aspects of our theory, however, render it short of fully general and formulaically applicable. Many of our specific assumptions are based on intuition rather than direct evidence." (p. 31).
The assumptions of many theoretical models are based on intuition rather than direct evidence. But in standard models, any future test of the assumptions and the underlying intuitions requires direct (revealed-preference) evidence. Where Köszegi-Rabin differ from standard economics is that intuition based on psychological principles is viewed as an alternative form of evidence and it is this type of evidence that is the focus of their attention. 13 In Köszegi-Rabin, utility indices (u k 's) and attachment disutilities (measured by µ) are hedonic utilities and are distinct from choice utilities. The Köszegi-Rabin representation is not only a theory of choice but also a description of the underlying psychological process:
"By all intuition and evidence, the feeling of loss when giving up a mug is a real hedonic experience, and making choices reflecting that real hedonic experience is partly rational. But as interpreted by Kahneman (2001) and Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) , people seem to over-attend to this experience because they ignore that the sensation of loss will pass very quickly -behaving as if they would spend much time longing for the mug they once had."
Hence, measured feelings are inputs in the Köszegi-Rabin analysis. The authors believe that these measurements will enable the analyst to identify hedonic utilities that capture the intrinsic satisfaction of consuming the good (i.e., the u k 's) and hedonic utilities that capture the real loss associated with giving up the good. Moreover, they expect hedonic measurements to distinguish behavior that results from rational assessment of utilities from behavior that results from over-attending to utilities. In Köszegi-Rabin, the revealed preference consequences of their theory are of minor interest. Instead, the model's success is judged by the extent to which the psychological process suggested by their formula matches psychological evidence.
The Failure of Rationality
Neuroeconomists share with many other critics of economics the view that individual rationality is an empirically invalid assumption. Over the years, critics of rationality have identified various economic assumptions as 'rationality.' The independence axiom, probabilistic sophistication, monotonicity of payoffs in the agent's own consumption, or the independence of payoffs from the consumption of others have all been viewed as implications of rationality before the emergence of economic models that relax these assumptions.
More recent criticisms of rationality focus on the fact that individuals make systematic mistakes even in situations where the right choice is clear. The most ambitious critics of rationality argue that the idea of utility maximization is flawed because individuals do not maximize any preference relation. In section 5.2 we argue that these criticisms typically underestimate the flexibility revealed preference methodology. In particular, we illustrate how standard economics deals with 'mistakes.' In section 5.1, we focus on the evidence reported by neuroeconomists in support of their criticism. We observe that much of this evidence misses its target because economic models make no predictions about physiological processes that underly decision making. The second item challenges the adequacy of revealed preference data:
"Inferring preferences from a choice does not tell us everything we need to know, and may tell us very little. Consider the hypothetical case of two people, Al and Naucia, who both refuse to buy peanuts at a reasonable price (cf. Romer, 2000). The refusal to buy reveals a common disutility for peanuts. But Al turned down the peanuts because he is allergic: consuming peanuts causes a prickly rash, shortens his breath, and could even be fatal. Naucia turned down the peanuts because she ate a huge bag of peanuts at a circus years ago, and subsequently got sick from eating too much candy at the same time. Since then, her gustatory system associates peanuts with illness and she refuses them at reasonable prices. While Al and Naucia both revealed an identical disutility, a neurally-detailed account tells us more. Al has an inelastic demand for peanuts-you can't pay him enough to eat them!-while Naucia would try a fistful for the right price. It is often impossible to infer preferences from a single decision. In fact, finding a small class of such experiments to identify the individual's utility function is the central concern of revealed preference theory. Hence, not buying peanuts at a single price does not imply "...Al and Naucia both revealed an identical disutility" and while "a neurally-detailed account" could "tell us more," the economically meaningful information can only be elicited with a change in prices. In standard economics, the reasons for a particular ranking of alternatives is irrelevant. That Al might die from consuming peanuts and Naucia simply doesn't like consuming them matters only if at some price Naucia is willing to do so and Al is not; and even then, it is the latter fact and not the underlying reasons that are relevant.
We delay the discussion of the third item to the next section where we discuss welfare analysis. The fourth item discusses money illusion:
"A fourth problem with preference is that people are assumed to value money for what it can purchase -that is, the utility of income is indirect, and should be derived from direct utilities for goods that will be purchased with money. But roughly speaking, it appears that similar brain circuitry -dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain -is active for a wide variety of rewarding experiences -drugs, food, attractive faces (cite), humor There are straightforward economic tests for identifying money illusion. Such a test would entail changing prices and nominal wages in a manner that leaves the set of feasible consumption, labor supply pairs unchanged. Then, we could check if this change has shifted the labor supply curve. But the issue cannot be addressed by investigating the brain circuitry and the midbrain, since economic models are silent on the brain activity associated with decision making.
The final item deals with addiction:
"Addiction is an important topic for economics because it seems to resist rational explanation. .... It is relevant to rational models of addiction that every substance to which humans may become biologically addicted is also potentially addictive for rats.
Addictive substances appear therefore to be "hijacking" primitive reward circuitry in the "old" part of the human brain. Although this fact does not disprove the rational model (since recently-evolved cortex may override rat-brain circuitry), it does show that rational intertemporal planning is not necessary to create the addictive phenomena of tolerance, craving, and withdrawal. It also highlights the need for economic models of the primitive reward circuitry, which would apply equally to man and rat. ..
..." (CLP (2004) p. 565-566).
That substances addictive for rats are also addictive in humans is not relevant for economics because (standard) economics does not study rats. 14 It also does not study the causes of preferences. To say that a decision-maker prefers x to y is to say that he never chooses y when x is also available, nothing more. Hence, addiction can be identified as a distinct 14 Presumably, psychologists interested in human physiology find it worthwhile to study rats because of the similarities in the neurological make-up of the two species. Apparently, the similarities between the economic institutions of the two species are not sufficient to generate interests in rats among economists. economic phenomenon only through its distinct choice implications not through the underlying brain processes. The fact that addictive substances appear to be "hijacking primitive reward circuitry," fails to disprove the rational model not because the cortex may override rat-brain circuitry but because the rational model addresses neither the brain-circuitry nor the cortex.
What the authors describe as evidence is in fact a statement of a their philosophical position. They have decided that the cortex represents planned action (rational choice), while certain processes in other parts (presumably in the midbrain) represent overwhelming physiological influences (i.e., the hijacking of the primitive reward circuitry). Hence, every decision that is associated with the latter types of processes is interpreted as evidence that rational choice theory is wrong. This critique fails because standard economics takes no position on whether a particular decision represents a manifestation of free will or a succumbing to biological necessity. Rationality in economics is not tied to physiological causes of behavior and therefore the physiological mechanisms cannot shed light on whether a choice is rational or not in the sense economists use the term. Brain mechanisms by themselves cannot offer evidence against transitivity of preferences or any other choicetheoretic assumption. Therefore, evidence that utility maximization is not a good model of the brain cannot refute economic models.
Discussing decision making under uncertainty, Camerer (2005) writes:
"For example, when economists think about gambling they assume that people combine the chance of winning (probability) with an expectation of how they will value winning and losing ("utilities"). If this theory is correct, neuroeconomics will find two processes in the brain -one for guessing how likely one is to win and lose, and another for evaluating the hedonic pleasure and pain of winning and losing-and another brain region which combines probability and hedonic sensations. More likely, neuroeconomics will show that the desire or aversion to gamble is more complicated than that simple model."
Camerer assumes that there is one set of correct abstractions for both economics and neuroscience and tries to identify whether the ones currently used in economics belong to that set. The conceptual separation between probabilities and utilities is very important for expected utility theory. This separation need not have a physiological counterpart. Even if it did, mapping that process into the physiology of the brain and seeing if it amounts to "one [process] for guessing how likely one is to win and lose, and another for evaluating the hedonic pleasure and pain of winning and losing-and another brain region which combines probability and hedonic sensations" is a problem for neuroscience, not economics. Since expected utility theory makes predictions only about choice behavior, its validity can be assessed only through choice evidence. If economic evidence leads us to the conclusion that expected utility theory is appropriate in a particular set of applications, then the inability to match this theory to the physiology of the brain might be considered puzzling. But this puzzle is a concern for neuroscientists, not economists.
Standard economics does not address mental processes and, as a result, economic abstractions are typically not appropriate for describing them. In his (1998) survey, Rabin criticizes standard economics for failing to be a good model of the mind, even though standard economics never had such ambitions:
"Economists have traditionally assumed that, when faced with uncertainty, people correctly form their subjective probabilistic assessments according to the laws of probability. But researchers have documented many systematic departures from rationality in judgment under uncertainty."
Many economists (including the authors of many introductory economic textbooks) are aware that most people do not think in terms of probabilities, subjective or otherwise.
Nor does standard economics assume that consumers know Bayes' law in the sense that a graduate student in economics would be expected to know it. Economic models connect to reality through economic variables, prices, quantities etc. and not through their modeling of the individual's decision-making process. Evidence of the sort cited in neuroeconomics may inspire economists to write different models but it cannot reject economic models.
Our central argument is simple: neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models because the latter make no assumptions or draw no conclusions about physiology of the brain. Conversely, brain science cannot revolutionize economics because it has no vehicle for addressing the concerns of the latter. Economics and psychology differ in the question they ask. Therefore, abstractions that are useful for one discipline will typically be not very useful for the other. The concepts of a preference, a choice function, demand function, GDP, utility, etc. have proven to be useful abstraction in economics. The fact that they are less useful for the analysis of the brain does not mean that they are bad abstractions in economics.
Mistakes
Individuals sometimes make obviously bad decisions. Neuroeconomists use this fact as proof of the failure revealed preference theory. Bernheim Consider the following thought experiment. A prize ($100) is placed either in a red or in a blue box and the agent knows that there is a 60% chance that the money is in the red box. Confronted with a choice between the two boxes, the agent chooses the red box.
An observer who has seen that the money was placed in the blue box may think that the agent prefers choosing red to getting $100. This inference is obviously incorrect because "choose $100" is a strategy that is not available to the agent. The observer who thinks the agent prefers red to $100 has not understood the agent's constraints. Given agent's constraints, his choice of the red box is optimal.
Many situations in which agents systematically make mistakes can be interpreted as situations where agents face subjective constraints on the feasible strategies that are not apparent from the description of the decision problem. The strategy "only cross the street when no car is approaching" may be unavailable in the sense that it violates a subjective constraint on the set of feasible strategies. Hence, a standard economic model of the street-crossing problem would add a constraint on the set of feasible strategies as part of the description of the agent.
Suppose the economist asserts that the American tourist prefers not being run over by a car but finds it more difficult to implement that outcome in the UK than in the US.
As evidence for this assertion the economist could point to data showing that American tourists in London avoid unregulated intersections. That tourists incur a cost to cross at regulated intersections suggests (i) they are unable to safely cross the street without help and (ii) they are not suicidal.
Framing effects can be addressed in a similar fashion. Experimenters can often manipulate the choices of individuals by restating the decision problem in a different (but equivalent) form. Standard theory interprets a framing effect as changes in the subjective constraints (or information) faced by the decision maker. It may turn out that a sign that alerts the American tourist to 'look right' alters the decision even though such a sign does not change the set of alternatives. The standard model incorporates this effect by assuming that the sign changes the set of feasible strategies for the tourist and thereby alters the decision. With the help of the sign, the tourist may be able to implement the strategy "always look right then go" while without the sign this strategy may not be feasible for the tourist.
For standard economics, the fact that individuals make mistakes is relevant only if these mistakes can be identified through economic data. That behavior would have been different under a counter-factual scenario in which the agent did not make or was prevented from making these mistakes, is irrelevant.
The Inadequacy of Rationality
Neuroeconomists criticize both standard positive economics and standard normative analysis. In the previous section, we described and responded to the neuroeconomic critique of positive economics. Here, we address the neuroeconomic critique of normative economics. Kahneman (1994) notes that "[t]he term 'utility' can be anchored in the hedonic experience of outcomes, or in the preference or desire for that outcome." Because agents make Neuroeconomists use such evidence and related (thought) experiments to suggest that the concept of a preference that simultaneously determines behavior and "what is good for the agent" can be wide off the mark. Hence, neuroeconomists distinguish between "decision utilities", which generate behavior, and "experienced utilities" which indicate what makes the agent happy.
In section 6.2, we discuss and respond to this neuroeconomic critique of standard welfare analysis. In sections 6.3 and 6.4, we consider two examples of substantive rationality in the literature: recent proposals for paternalism (section 6.3) and welfare analysis in multi-self models (section 6.4). First, we provide a brief summary of standard welfare economics.
Standard Welfare Analysis
Economists use welfare analysis to examine how institutions mediate the interests of the participating individuals. Welfare improving changes to an economic institution are defined to be changes to which the individual(s) would agree. The policy x is deemed better than the policy y for an individual if and only if, given the opportunity, the individual would choose x over y. The choice of x over y may be motivated by the pursuit of happiness, a sense of duty or religious obligation, or reflect an impulse. In all cases, it constitutes an improvement of economic welfare.
Economic welfare analysis is a tool for analyzing economic institutions and models. This use of welfare analysis requires the standard definition of economic welfare. There is no reason for economic agents to gravitate towards policies and institutions that yield higher welfare if the underlying notion of welfare does not reflect the interests of agents as the agents themselves perceive these interests.
Neuroeconomic Welfare Analysis
Neuroeconomists treat the economists definition of welfare as if it were a theory of happiness and proceed to find evidence against this theory. CLP write, "Economics proceeds on the assumption that satisfying people's wants is a good thing. Welfare in economics is a definition and not a theory (of happiness). Therefore, the divergence of "liking and wanting" does not pose any challenge to the standard definition of welfare, no matter how the former is defined. Standard economics offers no substantive criterion for rationality because it has no therapeutic ambition; it does not attempt to cure decision-makers who make choices that do not generate the most pleasure. The more modest economic definition of welfare is mandated by the role of welfare analysis in economics.
To compare this role with the role envisaged by neuroeconomists, suppose that a trading institution is found to be (economically) inefficient. Typically, this will imply that someone can set up an alternative institution and make a profit. Hence, we can expect this change to take place without a benevolent dictator, simply as a result of self-interested entrepreneurship. Suppose a psychologist argues that an inefficient trading institution leads to higher 'experienced' utility than an efficient one and agents are mistaken in their preference for the economically efficient institution. Whether or not this assertion is true, the economic analysis of the trading institution is valid. The economically efficient trading institution is still the one we can expect to prevail. Moreover, since agents perceive their own interests to coincide with the economic welfare criterion there is no obvious mechanism (economic or political) by which the psychologically superior institution could emerge.
Neuroeconomists would argue that even though a welfare criterion based on the individuals own "preferences or desires" may be relevant for positive analysis, a substantive criterion is needed for normative theory. For neuroeconomists, the goal of welfare analysis is to advocate changes that improve decision-maker's well-being. To achieve their goal, neuroeconomists can either try to convince people to want what is good for them (therapy) or make the right choice on their behalf (paternalism). Kahneman (1994) Of course, one could argue that economists should identify a substantive criterion for rationality (i.e., a criterion for measuring what really makes individuals happy) and advocate changes that increase welfare according to this criterion regardless of whether or not they have the means to convince the potential beneficiaries to follow this advice.
The hope being that someone other than the potential beneficiary might be convinced to implement the policies. This view is apparent in Kahneman's search for a benevolent paternalistic figure in his examples: ". . .the physician could probably ensure that the patient will retain a more favourable memory of the procedure by adding to it a medically superfluous period of diminishing pain. Of course, the patient would probably reject the physician's offer to provide an improved memory at the cost of more actual pain. Should the physician go ahead anyway, on behalf of the patient's future remembering self ?" (Kahneman (1994))
In the same article, Kahneman suggests that there is "a case in favour of some paternalistic interventions, when it is plausible that the state knows more about an individual's future tastes than the individual knows presently."
When economists or political scientists model the government, they do so either by endowing the government with certain objectives or by modeling government as an institution where conflicting incentives of various agents interact. In Kahneman's analysis, the government is a benign and disinterested agent whose only role is to serve as the object of the modeler's lobbying efforts.
Welfare analysis for neuroeconomics is a form of social activism; it is a recommendation for someone to change his preferences or for someone in a position of authority to intervene on behalf of someone else. In contrast, welfare economics in the standard economic model is integrated with the model's positive analysis; it takes agents' preferences as given and evaluates the performance of economic institutions.
Regardless of one's views on the importance and efficacy of social activism, there are advantages to separating the role of the economist as a researcher from the role a particular economist might play as an advocate. This separation enables the positive analysis to proceed without having to resolve difficult philosophical problems such as figuring out what makes people happy or who is more deserving of happiness. It also enables other researchers to assess and critique a particular piece of analysis without having to evaluate the merits of the underlying moral philosophy or the effectiveness of the researcher's activism.
Proposals for Paternalistic Welfare Criteria
Two recent articles outline plans for welfare economics based on paternalistic principles. In both papers, the authors are motivated by evidence showing that the specification of the default option affects individual choices of retirement plans. Rates of enrollment in 401(k) plans are significantly higher when the default option is to enroll than when the default option is not to enroll.
A standard interpretation of the 401(k) problem would argue that the default matters for the decision problem as perceived by the individual. The employee's set of feasible strategies changes with the default just as the feasible strategies of the American tourist in London change when a sign is placed at the side of the road alerting the tourist to look right. The welfare maximizing default option is the one that agents would choose when asked to choose among defaults.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) (henceforth TS) seek paternalistic principles for choosing a default option. TS advocate libertarian paternalism and suggest the following three guiding principles:
"First, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that majority would choose if explicit choices were required and revealed."
Hence, the libertarian paternalist is to substitute the predicted preferences of the majority for the preferences of the individual.
"Second, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that would force people to make their choices explicit." Finally, "the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that minimizes the number of opt-outs."
TS offer no arguments for why their principles are likely to lead to greater happiness.
In fact, they offer no defense of these principles. They simply say that the libertarian paternalist might choose to use them.
The fact that the TS principles are not particularly compelling as moral philosophy is a side issue. The real issue is that it is difficult to see what question their proposal addresses. To put it differently, it is unclear who they have in mind as the potential beneficiary of their philosophical argument. The TS motivation for paternalism seems to be that it is inevitable: "The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism. In many situations, some organization or agent must make a choice that will affect the choices of some other people."
Clearly, the decisions of one agent may affect the utility of others. Economic analysis suggests that the interests of the agent in control are a good place to start when analyzing such situations. For example, in order to maximize profits, firms may wish to make their benefit plans as attractive as possible to their future employees. In that case, firms will choose plans (and their default options) in accordance with how the employees would choose them. It may be impractical to ask prospective employees about their preferred default option on the retirement plan and therefore the firm will use its best subjective assessment of the employees preferences.
Of course, the employer may have different objectives and may choose a plan that differs from his best guess of the employees preferred plan. Presumably, he would do so to increase his own welfare. In this situation, as in the situation of the pure profit maximizing employer, it is unlikely that there is any role for the TS principles. The TS argument amounts to telling employers that when they face incomplete information they should adopt a different objective. Standard economics would predict that employers will take the best action given their own objectives and given what they know about the preferences of the employees.
In a recent paper, Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O'Donoghue and Rabin (2003, henceforth CILOR) introduce and advocate the notion of "asymmetric paternalism:" "A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational." CILOR do not explain which preferences reflect bounded rationality and which reflect full rationality, when benefits are large and when there is little or no harm. Nevertheless, their implicit welfare criterion is familiar. As we described in section 5.2, the mistakes of boundedly rational agents can be modeled as a subjective informational constraint facing these agents. With this re-interpretation, the CILOR principle amounts to an (epsilon) version of the Pareto principle: help the uninformed without hurting the informed (too much). However, there is an important difference between the CILOR version of the Pareto principle and the Pareto principle in standard economics: CILOR view their principle as a framework for activism. They urge their readers to adopt their modified libertarian philosophy in place of the purely libertarian philosophy that they perceive as guiding many economists (and perhaps some lawyers) or the unabashed paternalism favored by behavioral economists.
"Our paper seeks to engage two different audiences with two different sets of concerns:
For those (particularly economists) prone to rigid antipaternalism, the paper describes a possibly attractive rationale for paternalism as well as a careful, cautious, and disciplined approach. For those prone to give unabashed support for paternalistic policies based on behavioral economics, this paper argues that more discipline is needed and proposes a possible criterion" (CILOR p. 1212).
Of course, it is legitimate for TS and CILOR to engage employers or the legal and economics professions in a moral debate. But this has little to do with welfare economics which is not concerned with moral philosophy or with providing a disciplined guide for social action.
Standard economists spend little time or effort advocating normative criteria even when they feel that the right normative criterion is unambiguous. For example, many economists and decision-theorists believe in the importance of making decisions under uncertainty consistent with some subjective probability assessments. Moreover, hardly anyone would question the normative appeal of using Bayes' law when updating probabilities.
There are many research papers where agents are endowed with subjective probabilities and use Bayes law. The purpose of these papers is not to advocate the use of subjective probabilities or Bayesian revision; rather, the normative appeal of the Savage model serves as a starting point for the positive analysis. The ultimate value of Savage's contribution depends not on the ability of his followers to convince individual economic agents or benign planners to adopt his view of probability but on the success his followers have at developing models that address economic data.
Preference Reversals and Multiselves
There is evidence that individuals resolve the same intertemporal trade-off differently depending on when the decision is made. 15 Researchers, starting with the work of Strotz 15 See Loewenstein, et al. for a recent survey of the experimental evidence. In the typical experiment, subjects choose between a smaller, date 2 reward and a larger, date 3 reward. If the choice is made at date 2, then the smaller-earlier reward is chosen. If the choice is made earlier (i.e., at date 1) then the larger-later reward is chosen. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as dynamic inconsistency or a preference reversal. Standard economic models identify choice with welfare. Therefore, the choice of (0, 3, 0) from C in period 2 is welfare maximizing as is the choice of {(0, 0, 9)} over {(0, 3, 0)} in period 1. The interpretation is that, in period 2, the agent struggles with the temptation to consume 3 units. Temptation is costly to resist and therefore consuming (rather than holding out for 9 in period 3) is the optimal (and welfare maximizing) choice in period 2.
In period 1, higher period 2 consumption is not tempting and therefore the agent prefers {(0, 0, 9)} over {(0, 3, 0)}. Period 1 behavior reveals that the individual's welfare is higher in all periods when he is committed to (0, 0, 9) than when he must choose from C in period 2. 16 The multi-self model abandons the revealed preference approach to welfare and constructs paternalistic welfare criteria. Consider again the three period model. In each period, the individual's preference are described by a utility function, U t . For concreteness, assume:
where δ = β = 1/2. While different papers postulate different welfare criteria for such situations, the common argument is that preference reversals necessitate a criterion for trading-off the utility of the various selves. The most common practice in this literature is to treat the U 0 below as the welfare criterion.
This particular welfare criterion may seem odd. After all, U 0 quite arbitrarily sets β = 1 and assigns a higher welfare to (1, 0, 11) than to (2, 3, 0) even though selves 1 and 2 prefer (2, 3, 0). The multiple-selves literature interprets U 0 as the preferences with the"present bias" removed. 17 In other words, β < 1 is diagnosed as a defect and the role of policy intervention is to cure this defect.
Note that hyperbolic discounting (or time inconsistency) is not necessary for generating conflict among the various selves of the individual: Consider again the three period example above but now let β = 1. The resulting utility functions describe standard preferences with exponential discounting. Consider the two consumption streams:
(1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 4) and note that U 1 (1, 0, 0) = U 1 (0, 0, 4) but U 2 (1, 0, 0) < U 2 (0, 0, 4) and Identifying what makes people happy, defining criteria for trading-off one person's (or selves) happiness against the happiness of another, and advocating social change in a manner that advances overall happiness by this criterion is a task many neuroeconomists find more worthy than dealing with the more pedestrian questions of standard economics.
However, the expression of this preference constitutes neither an empirical nor a methodological criticism of standard economics.
The Unification of Economics and Neuroscience
Neuroeconomists often cite improvements in neuroscience, in particular, improvements in measurements, as a central reason for unifying the disciplines of economics, psychology, and brain science:
"Since feelings were meant to predict behavior, but could only be assessed from behav- and sophisticated the measurement the greater is the potential benefit of specialization.
Brain imaging data are of a radically different form than typical economic data. If the prediction of great advances in brain science turn out to be correct, they will certainly be accompanied by theoretical advances that address the particular data in that field. It is unreasonable to require those theories to be successful at addressing economic data as well. By the same token, the requirement that economic theories simultaneously account for economic data and brain imaging data places an unreasonable burden on economic theories.
Note that the above does not say that psychological factors are irrelevant for economic decision making, nor does it say that economists should ignore psychological insights.
Economists routinely take their inspiration from psychological data or theories. However, Populating economic models with "flesh-and-blood human beings," was never the objective of economists. Constrained optimization, Bayes law, and other economic abstractions do not represent the state-of-the art psychology of an earlier era. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that making the state-of-the art psychology of our time available earlier would have had such a profound effect on the development of economics.
Rabin (1998) argues that
"it is sometimes misleading to conceptualize people as attempting to maximize a coherent, stable, and accurately perceived U (x)."
Economists have at their disposal numerous devices to incorporate instability (or change) into individual preferences. They can assume that the decision-maker's preferences depend on an exogenous state variable, on the information of his opponents, or his own consumption history. The decision-maker may be learning about a relevant preference parameter, over time. All this flexibility or permissiveness notwithstanding, it is likely that the economists' model of the individual is not suitable for psychologists' goals. It does not follow from this that economists should adopt both the goals and methods of psychology.
Regardless of the source of their inspiration, economic models can only be evaluated on their own terms, with respect to their own objectives and evidence. A revolution in economics has to yield great economic insights. The CLP and Rabin agendas seem far reaching only because they define the task of economics as continually importing psychologyneuroscience ideas. Both papers offer very little in the way of novel economic analysis or implications. Rabin observes that ". . . fairness and reference-level effects (reviewed in Section 2) and framing effects (reviewed in Section 4) are likely to contribute to downward stickiness in wages" but leaves "it for other forums to explore these implications." Similarly, all the challenges CLP (2005) identify for the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics resemble the current questions of psychology more than the current questions of economics.
A choice theory paper in economics must identify the revealed preference implications of the model presented and describe how revealed preference methods can be used to identify its parameters. Revealed preference earns such a central role in economics because this is the form of evidence that is available to economists -and not because of a philosophical stance against other forms of evidence.
Greater psychological realism is not an appropriate modeling criterion for economics and therapeutic social activism is not its goal. Welfare analysis helps economists understand how things are by comparing the existing situation to how things might have been in a plausible alternative institutional setting; welfare theory is not a blueprint for a social movement.
We may be sceptical of neuroscientists' ability to come up with a universal, physiologically grounded criteria for measuring happiness. We may also have doubts about the potential effectiveness of neuroeconomists at convincing individuals or society as a whole, to adopt policies that increase "total happiness" by their measure. Our response to the neuroeconomics welfare theory is simpler: such a combination of moral philosophy and activism has never been the goal of economics; grounding this combination in biology is unlikely to make it so.
Let K x,y = K\{(y, y), (x, x), (x, y), (y, x)} and note that for k ∈ K x,y 2 ≥ u k (x) − u k (y) ≥ −2 ( * * )
Equations ( 
